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COMMENTS
AFTER ALYESKA: WILL PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION SURVIVE?
INTRODUCTION

On what principle of justice can a plaintiff wrongfully run
down on a public highway recover his doctor's bill but not
his lawyer's bill? And on what principle of justice is a
defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court made
to pay out of his own pocket the expense of showing that
he was wrongfully suedT

The traditional American rule governing attorneys' fees
requires that each litigant bear his own legal expenses. This
practice varies from that of almost every other country in the
world, a fact which has not escaped the attention of legal writers.' Since 1929, when the first major critical analysis appeared,' legal scholars have periodically subjected the rule to
intense and generally unfavorable scrutiny. The recent growth
of public interest litigation, with the concomitant development
of the private attorney general rationale, has generated a wide1. First Report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts, 11 MAss. L.Q. 1, 64
(1925).
2. See, e.g., Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 13 CAL. ST. B.J. (1938);
Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
792 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig]; Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929)
[hereinafter cited as Goodhart]; King & Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public
Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. REV. 27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
King & Plater; Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA
L. REV. 75 (1963); Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity
System, 55 IOWA L. REv. 26 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Mause]; McCormick, Counsel
Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV.
619 (1931) [hereinafter cited as McCormick]; McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of FinancingLegal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as McLaughlin]; Stirling, Attorneys' Fees: Who Should Bear the
Burden?, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 874 (1966); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A
Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Comment, Court Awarded
Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Equal Access]; Note, Balancing the Equities in
Attorney Fee Awards: Losing Plaintiffs and Private Defendants, 62 GEO. L.J. 1439
(1974); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General": Judicial
Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 733 (1973);
Note, Attorney's Fees as an Element of Damage, 15 U. CIN. L. REV. 313 (1941); Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216 (1967);
Note, Distributionof Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699 (1940).
3. Goodhart, supra note 2.
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spread interest in the subject and increased the stream of critical commentary. In general, the writers urge that it is time for
at least a partial abandonment of our present system, and call
for further development of the practice of fee-shifting, either by
legislative direction or by the exercise of the court's equitable
powers. 4 However, the recent Supreme Court decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society5 is certain
to inhibit further development of the judiciary's equitable
power to award attorneys' fees. The need for legislative guidance in the area has become critical.
An exhaustive treatment of all the problems involved in
the area of attorneys' fees is obviously not possible in one comment, if indeed it is possible at all.' Therefore, this comment
will be confined to the issue of attorneys' fees in connection
with public interest litigation. It will briefly explore some of the
established means of obtaining attorneys' fees, examine the
scope and assess the impact of Alyeska on past and future
equitable awards of attorneys' fees, and consider the need for
and the likelihood of federal legislation in the area. Finally, an
attempt will be made to discover if the California courts can
be expected to adopt a more liberal stance than can now be
anticipated from the federal courts.
THE AMERICAN RULE

Past, Problems and Proposals
By the middle of the 18th century in England, the prevailing litigant could recover attorneys' fees both at law and in
equity. 7 The rule, however, was not followed in the United
States. It has been suggested that the American public basically distrusted lawyers; that the law could be understood by
anyone, so lawyers were unnecessary;' and even that the development of the American rule was influenced by the sporting

.

4. See articles cited note 2 supra.
5. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
6. Hearings were conducted by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on various aspects of attorney's fees in October, 1973. The report contains 1778
pages without reaching a consensus of where we are, let alone where we should be.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary on the Effect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
7. McCormick, supra note 2, at 619.
8. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 873.
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theory of early American justice'-since the law is a gamble at
best, it would be unfair to penalize the losing party even further
by requiring him to pay two legal fees.'" As a corollary, taxing
the loser with his opponent's legal fees might tend to discourage poor litigants from bringing good faith claims to court,
thereby undercutting the principle that the courts are forums
open to all for the resolution of disputes."
Ironically, the last argument provides ammunition for
both the advocates and the opponents of the present system.
Those who oppose fee-recovery have suggested that if the rule
were changed, already-crowded courts would be inundated
with plaintiffs filing suit, firm in their rectitude and convinced
that they would recover both damages and fees." On the other
hand, there is a real danger that the possibility of having to pay
two legal fees will deter litigants with legitimate claims from
pursuing a remedy in court.'" Some have suggested that a
change in the rule would help unclog the courts by providing
incentive for settlement;' 4 others fear that such a change would
actually lead to coerced settlements,'" since a corporate or
wealthy defendant who could afford the risk would be in a
position to pressure a less affluent claimant into a premature
or unjust settlement on a debatable claim.'"
The gambling theory was perhaps best refuted by
Professor Goodhart, who argued that since the costs have to be
paid by someone, it is at least more probable that the losing
party was in the wrong and he or she ought to pay the fees."
9. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 127 (1921).
10. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 876-77.
11. Id. at 874.
12. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from Funds,
87 Hnav. L. REv. 1597, 1598-99 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dawson].
13. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)
(dictum); Goodhart, supra note 2, at 876-77.
14. Dawson, supra note 12, at 1598; McCormick, supra note 2, at 642.
15. See Mause, supra note 2; Comment, Equal Access, supra note 2, at 651-52.
16. Professor Goodhart, however, believed that the American system lent itself
to greater coercion than the English system:
[Tihe English system of costs is of advantage to the poor litigant
... .As long as the cost of fighting a case is merely nominal, as it is
under the American practice, the wealthy defendant, especially if the
defendant is a corporation, will frequently refuse to pay a just claim on
the chance of winning on a technicality or of tiring out the plaintiff. It is
the poor man who cannot afford to wait for his money and can, therefore,
be forced to accept an unfair settlement by fear of long delay.
Goodhart, supra note 2, at 876.
17. Id. at 877.
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In response to one particular critic, he retorted, "If New Jersey
justice is so much a matter of luck, it hardly seems worthwhile
to have courts and lawyers; it would be cheaper, and certainly
less dilatory, to spin a coin."' 8
Professor Ehrenzweig has pointed out that even though
courts occasionally will make erroneous decisions, so that requiring the losing party to pay the other's legal expenses would
compound the injustice, the fact remains that under the present system, the prevailing party is almost always unjustly burdened with legal expenses necessitated by the loser's wrongful
action."
Further objections are that legal fees are too remote from
the defendant's wrongful conduct to justify recovery; that it
would be difficult to establish proper fees; and that lawyers
would charge excessive fees if they expected to be reimbursed
by the other party.20
As a practical matter, however, the cost of obtaining legal
assistance-normal, foreseeable conduct on the part of the victim of a wrongful act-could hardly be considered more remote
than court costs which are regularly allowed to the prevailing
party.' It is true that awarding attorneys' fees might create a
problem in determining the amount properly recoverable. The
traditional English system was widely criticized because it involved a statutory fee schedule prescribing the amount allowable for each service performed, thus requiring that every step
in the legal process be accounted for by the attorney seeking
compensation.2 2 This was an extremely cumbersome procedure. Although the system was revised in 1953,23 "[t]here is
no section of the community that is satisfied with the present
18. Id.
19. Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 797.
20. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 780-81.
21. Id. at 781.
22. A thorough discussion of the traditional English system is found in Goodhart,
supra note 2, at 854-72.
23. For non-contentious work (i.e., non-court proceedings), a solicitor now gives
a general description of the work done and charges the client based on the amount of
work, its complexity and other relevant matters. This amount may be appealed to a
taxing master. In 1960, a similar system was instituted for contentious work. For
substantially routine processes, the charges are fixed, but "where something is a matter of professional skill and experience the charge is either left to be settled between a
prescribed maximum and a prescribed minimum, or it is 'discretionary.'" This sum
may also be appealed to a taxing master. R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN
ENGLAND 327-28 (5th ed. 1967).
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cost of litigation."2 4 Yet systems which leave the award up to

the judge's discretion have also received much criticism. This
is the situation in Alaska, the only state which by statute provides for attorneys' fees as costs to the prevailing party in all
cases "[u]nless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs
... "2 Although the Alaska statute sets up a schedule for
allowable fees, based on percentages of the total recovery, the
court clearly is permitted to deviate from the schedule, which
it frequently does. Furthermore, where there is no monetary
recovery, or the judgment is not an accurate measure for determining the fee, the court may award whatever amount it deems
appropriate. There has been so much discontent with the resulting uneven fee awards that the statute may very well be
repealed soon.2"
Nor does the fear that fee-shifting would generate higher
legal charges appear to have proved justified in those areas
where the court already does make fee awards. 7
24. Id. at 334. The current system is fully discussed in id., ch. 5, at 324-50.
25. ALAS. R. Civ. P. 82(a) [hereinafter cited as Alaska Rule 82] states:
(a) Allowance to PrevailingParty as Costs.
(1) Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following
schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the
party recovering any money judgment therein, as part of the costs of the
action allowed by law:
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN AVERAGE CASES

FIRST
NEXT
NEXT
OVER

$2,000.
$3,000
$5,000
$10,000

Contested

Without
Trial

NonContested

25%
20%
15%
10%

20%
15%
12.5%
7.5%

15%
12.5%
10%
5%

Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees for the prevailing party may
be fixed by the court as a part of the costs of the action, in its discretion,
in a reasonable amount.
(2) In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria
[sic] for determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the
court shall award a fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal
services rendered.
(3) The allowance of attorney's fees by the court in conformance with
the foregoing schedule is not to be construed as fixing the fees between
attorney and client.
26. Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in Alaska: An Analysis of Rule 82, 4
U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REV. 129, 147 & n.113 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Attorney's Fees in Alaska].
27. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 781.
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The Exceptions
The effects of fee-shifting are not entirely a matter of spec-

ulation, since there are several situations in which fee awards
have traditionally been permitted: for instance, one may contract to reimburse the prevailing party for his attorneys' fees if
litigation is necessary;2" the court may order the wife's legal fees
to be paid by the husband in a divorce action; 9 and where the
defendant's wrongful conduct has caused the plaintiff to prosecute or defend a prior suit, the plaintiff may recover all reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, of the prior suit." Further, there are many statutes which expressly provide for
awards of "reasonable" attorneys' fees; 3 and the judicially created doctrines of bad faith and "common fund," the progenitor
of the private attorney general rationale, are exceptions of long
standing. The problems inherent in the concept of fee-shifting
do not appear to have proved insurmountable in these areas,
though difficulties do unquestionably exist.
Antitrust, divorce. Fee awards have long been established
in the antitrust area under the Clayton Act.32 While one court
pointed out that "reasonableness" depended on the facts of the

particular case, and that a reasonable fee in one set of circumstances might be totally unreasonable in another,33 the factors
28. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18
(1967); McCormick, supra note 2, at 636-37. Some states have codified this common
law exception with the added qualification that such contracts be enforced reciprocally. E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1717 (West 1973).
29. McCormick, supra note 2, at 626.
30. Id. at 630-31.
31. E.g., Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1946); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1955); Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1916); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(e), 78r(a) (1934); Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(1968); Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1970); Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1938); Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964); tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1964);
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1968); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1972).
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-61 n.33
(1975), for a thorough list of federal statutes which provide for attorneys' fees. Some
acts make awards mandatory, such as the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1955); the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1938); Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (1968); and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1942). Others
are discretionary with the court: the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, tit. I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1964).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1955).
33. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf., 166 F. Supp. 163, 16669 (E.D. Pa. 1958), alf'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S.
127 (1961).
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usually considered in arriving at a fee are the amount of damages recovered, hourly rates of compensation, private fee arrangements, quality of counsel, difficulty of the case, time
spent by counsel, and public benefit from the antitrust action.' 4
It is generally recognized that the trial court has great discretion in determining the award, since it is in a good position to
evaluate the attorney's performance and to conclude whether
the requested fee is excessive.3 5
It is also customary to award attorneys' fees to the wife in
a divorce action. While the same basic factors are generally
considered in arriving at a figure, it is recognized that divorce
matters often require a greater expenditure of counsel's time.
Therefore, courts have noted that full remuneration for the
time expended cannot always be expected." Also, it is quite
common for a court to consider both the husband's ability to
pay and the amount needed by the wife in order to make an
effective presentation of her side of the controversy, 38 although
this does not seem to mean that large fees will be allowed on
the basis of the husband's wealth alone.3 1 In the domestic area,
the courts seem to be somewhat more willing to consider the
matter of fees on appeal. The fact remains, however, that in
these and other areas where fees are regularly awarded, the
judiciary has not been overwhelmed and unable to cope with
the appeals that do result.
Bad faith. The federal courts have not hesitated to use
their equitable powers to award attorneys' fees when a party
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive
reasons-the judicially created "obdurate behavior" exception.4 In such cases fees are awarded to protect the honest
litigant and the courts by penalizing the bad faith litigant for
unreasonable litigation tactics. 4 ' This exception has often been
34. See, e.g., Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 750, 771-88 (1974).
35. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 781, 786.
36. Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 157 (1974). ,
37. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jayne, 200 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 1972); DeWitt v.
DeWitt, 86 S.D. 59, 191 N.W.2d 177 (1971).
38. See, e.g., Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 112 A.2d 466 (1955); Moreland v.
Moreland, 232 Ore. 309, 374 P.2d 741 (1962); Davidson v. Davidson, 191 Pa. Super.
312, 156 A.2d 553 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1961); Young v. Young,
354 Mich. 254, 92 N.W.2d 328 (1958).
40. E.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Guardian Trust
Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on other grounds,
281 U.S. 1 (1930); see 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIE 54.77(2) (1976), at 1709.
41. King & Plater, supra note 2, at 41.
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applied in civil rights litigation, 2 an area in which the exception has been expanded to include cases where "the court
shifted its focus away from the culpability of the party litigants
qua litigants to consider also the relevance of defendants'
extra-judicial conduct in the extended public interest context."43
Common fund and the development of the private attorney generalrationale.A second major, judicially created exception to the American rule is the common fund doctrine. Originally, courts permitted a plaintiff to recover attorneys' fees
when his action in bringing suit resulted in the recovery or
establishment of a fund in which others had the right to share.
In order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the others who
stood to benefit at the expense of the successful plaintiff, each
direct beneficiary was charged with a portion of the litigant's
expenses, including attorneys' fees. The sum was ordinarily
recovered directly from the fund, before any distribution 1 ')
The common fund doctrine has undergone considerable
expansion over the years. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,45
the United States Supreme Court held that there need be no
re _tion of an "actual fund"_in order for the pla7-iff -torec6ver
his attorney's fees, as long as a "substantial benefit" of some
kind had accrued to the enriched class" and the court had
"jurisdiction over an entity through which the contribution can
be effected." 47 Mills was a stockholder's action to set aside a
corporate merger on the ground that the proxy solicitation for
the merger was materially misleading. The Court stated:
The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may
never produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees
could be paid does not preclude an award based on [the
common fund] rationale . . . . [N]othing in these cases
indicates that the suit must actually bring money into the
court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement of expenses."
42. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971);
NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691
(M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
43. King & Plater, supra note 2, at 42.
44. E.g., Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532 (1881).
45. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
46. Id. at 392-97.
47. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 276 (1975)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
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The Court further found that
[t]he stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair
and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion
that, in indicating the statutory policy, petitioners have
rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its
stockholders . .

.

.To award attorneys' fees in such a suit

...is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited from
them and that would have had to pay them had it brought
the suit. 9
Although no fund was produced in Mills, the case involved
the type of litigation which was associated with the common
fund doctrine. Two years later, however, the Court appeared to
be expanding the application of the doctrine still further when
it found that Hall v. Cole ' was "clearly governed by this aspect
of Mills."5 The Hall case was brought under section 102 of the2
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA),
the purpose of which was to guarantee all union members at

least " 'minimum standards of democratic process.' " Title I

was enacted specifically to protect union members' freedom of
speech and assembly,5" but contained no provision for feeshifting. However, the Court authorized an award, holding that
when the plaintiff vindicated his own right of free speech, he
"rendered a substantial service to his union as an institution
and to all its members."55
The violations in these cases, and others like them, could
only be remedied by the private actions of affected parties; but
the monetary harm suffered by any one individual is frequently
so small that, even if there is a recovery, it will not cover his
expenses. If an injunction is the only relief sought, there will
be nothing to offset the expense of the litigation. The Court
decided, therefore, that "to ensure that the right in question
Id. at 396-97.
412 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 7.
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter
have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil
action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate.
53. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 7 (1973), citing 105 CONG. REC. 6471 (1959) (testimony of Sen. McClellan).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
55. 412 U.S. at 8.
49.
50.
51.
52.
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could be enforced," 5 attorneys' fees should be awarded in
Mills, Hall and, presumably, other appropriate cases.
In addition to the apparent expansion of the common fund
doctrine in Mills and Hall, the Court had spoken favorably of
the private attorney general idea in Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc. 57 Newman was brought under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 5s which entitled the prevailing party
to an attorneys' fee at the discretion of the court. However, the
Supreme Court held that Congress intended that the fee always
be awarded, absent exceptional circumstances, 5 and described
the plaintiff as a "private attorney general" whose actions had
conferred a significant benefit on the public." Since the Court
in Hall was impressed by the "substantial service" to the
union,"' and in Newman by the "significant benefit" to the
public that the plaintiffs had rendered,62 many federal and
state courts were encouraged to begin awarding fees to successful plaintiffs in public interest litigation even without statutory
authorization.LVhat had begun as a means of preventing unjust enrichment by recipients of a common fund became a way
to reward a private attorney general for protecting the rights
of many.3
The specific factors which are generally used to determine
the propriety of allowing counsel fees under the private attorney general theory were stated in La Raza Unida v. Volpe: "1)
the effectuation of strong Congressional policies; 2) the number
of people who have benefited from plaintiffs' efforts; and 3) the
necessity for and financial burden of private enforcement." 3
56. Id.
57. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) provides:
In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States,
a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs, and the United States
shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
59. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). The Court
has not used the private attorney language unless a statute was involved.
60. Id.
61. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
62. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
63. 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The La Raza plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the construction of a highway project in Northern California. "The injunction was
granted on the grounds that the defendants failed to comply with § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and various sections of 23 U.S.C. dealing with
housing displacement and relocation." 57 F.R.D. at 95; see La Raza Unida v. Volpe,
337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971). These statutes did not provide for the award of

19761

AFTER ALYESKA

The private attorney general theory seemed to meet a very
specific and very important need; it was enthusiastically received as another exception to the traditional American fee
rule. The Alyeska case, however, has effectively halted any
extension of the doctrine in the federal courts, and has appreciably narrowed the range of circumstances in which its benefits
are available.
THE EFFECTS OF ALYESKA

The Case
When oil was discovered in Alaska, plans were soon under
way to facilitate its eventual delivery to the continental United
States. 4 In June, 1969, Alyeska, a consortium of the oil companies owning leases for exploration of the Prudhoe Bay area65
where the discovery was made, applied to the Department of
the Interior for three rights-of-way. One was for the pipeline
itself, which would run from the North Slope to the Port of
Valdez,6 while the others were for various construction projects
which would have to accompany it. In December, 1969, the
application was amended to request only the one pipeline
right-of-way. In addition, two special land use permits
(SLUP's) were requested which would have allowed for construction space and for the construction of a road from Prudhoe
attorneys' fees. Nevertheless, the district court believed that its equitable powers
permitted fees to be awarded in this situation under the private attorney general
theory. La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Numerous cases have been decided on similar criteria. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974);
Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Cornest v. Richland Parish
School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974); Brandenberger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885
(9th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973). For other cases
recognizing the private attorney general theory, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975).
64. A complete discussion of the course of this litigation may be found in Dominick & Brody, The Alaska Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Aloska
Pipeline Authorization Act, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 337 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dominick & Brody].
65. In 1968, Atlantic Richfield Co., Humble Oil & Refining Co., and British
Petroleum Corp. (the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System) applied for the permits involved.
In 1970, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System was replaced by Alyeska, which is owned
by ARCO Pipeline Co,, Mobil Pipeline Co., Phillips Petroleum Co., Amerada Ness
Corp., and Union Oil of California. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 241-42 n.2 (1975).
66. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 242 n.3 (1975);
Dominick & Brody, supra note 64, at 337-38 & nn.1-3.
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Bay to Livengood.5 7 In March, 1970, the Wilderness Society 8
filed suit requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that he intended
to issue the right-of-way and SLUP's in violation of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,69 and without requiring Alyeska to
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).70 On April 28, 1970, the District Court in Washington,
D.C., granted a preliminary injunction.7' During the ensuing 16
month period, Alyeska contracted with the State of Alaska to
build a public highway from Livengood to Prudhoe Bay (which
happened to follow a route almost identical to the one proposed
in Alyeska's request for the SLUP); consequently, Alyeska was
able to withdraw its SLUP application for a road.7"
The district court dissolved the preliminary injunction and
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on August 15, 1972, in an unreported opinion.7 3 Plaintiffs appealed, seeking to prevent the
Secretary of the Interior from issuing the permits for the pipeline.7"
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed. The court stated that a literal reading of
the Mineral Leasing Act section 28, combined with the legislative history of the section and the settled construction of the
administrative regulations, required the conclusion that the
Secretary of the Interior lacked the authority to grant the
SLUP requested by Aleyska.7 5 Though fully cognizant of the
fact that the injunction was going to cause further hardships,
not only for the oil companies involved but also for the people
and State of Alaska,7" the court suggested that the appropriate
67. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
68. Plaintiffs were the Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and intervenor David Anderson, Chairman of the Canadian Wildlife Federation. Dominick & Brody, supra note 64, at 341 n.10.
69. 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Section 28 provides for rights-of-way through public
lands for pipelines carrying oil or natural gas. The right-of-way is to be limited to the
ground occupied by the pipeline plus 25 feet on each side. Further, failure to comply
with the provisions of the section is ground for forfeiture of the grant.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
71. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and
Dominick & Brody, supra note 64, at 387-89, for other amendments made by Alyeska
to its application and a complete chronology of events.
73. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 851.
75. Id. at 847. Since this finding was sufficient to uphold the injunction, the court
did not deal with the NEPA issue. Id. at 848.
76. Id. at 847.
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procedure was for Congress to change the applicable law in
order to let the project continue." With the decision of the
court of appeals and the subsequent denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court,7" the judiciary, in effect, remanded the question to the legislature and insisted that Congress make the
necessary policy decisions. The court apparently believed that
such an important question, dealing as it did with two seemingly competing public interests-protection of the environment and development of a domestic oil supply-would be
more thoroughly and properly aired in Congress than in the
courts. "
Seven and a half months later, on November 16, 1973,
Congress resolved the issue by amending the Mineral Leasing
Act" "to allow the granting of the permits sought by Alyeska,
and declared that no further compliance with NEPA was necessary before construction of the pipeline could proceed."',
The Attorneys' Fee Award
The Alyeska plaintiffs returned to the court of appeals
seeking an award of attorneys' fees. In spite of a vigorous dissent, 2 the majority held that plaintiffs had prevailed against
Alyeska on the Mineral Leasing Act in question, that the litigation "had served as a catalyst to ensure that the Department
of the Interior drafted an impact statement [pursuant to
NEPA requirements] and that the statement was thorough
and complete"; 3 therefore, the court concluded, they should be
awarded attorneys' fees under the private attorney general
theory. 4 However, the court decided that it was precluded by
statute from taxing the fees to the federal government, 5 and
77. Id. at 848.
78. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 411 U.S. 917 (1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
79. Dominick & Brody, supra note 64, at 349.
80. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, tit. I, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1973),
formerly ch. 408, 67 Stat. 557 (1953).
81. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 244-45 (1975).
82. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1039-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 1034.
84. Id. at 1036.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees
and expenses of attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any
civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or
official of the United States acting in his official capacity, in any court
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that it would be inappropriate to assess the State of Alaska
since it had voluntarily participated in the suit."8 Consequently, Alyeska was ordered to pay half the amount determined by the district court to be a reasonable fee,"7 and plaintiffs were left to assume the share that would otherwise be
allocable to the government." Alyeska appealed and the Supreme Court reversed.89
The Supreme Court Decision
Although the Court arguably had recognized the validity
of the private attorney general theory in the past,9 ° the majority
concluded that it was not proper for the courts to invade the
legislature's province by sanctioning further erosion of the traditional American rule.' The Court pointed out that Congress
was aware that as a rule, attorneys' fees are not awarded to
prevailing parties in American courts.2 Further, by specifically
authorizing fee-shifting in various statutes, Congress apparently had exercised its right to alter the established procedure
only selectively. Since no provision for awards was made in any
statute applicable to the Alyeska litigation, the Court chose to
interpret the legislative silence as a directive that the general
rule should prevail.93 In addition, the Court held that it was
prevented from establishing such a major exception to the fee
rule by case law"4 and by the 1853 Act, 5 which specified "the
having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment for costs when taxed
against the Government shall, in an amount established by statute or
court rule or order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part the
prevailing party for the costs incurred by him in the litigation. Payment
of a judgment for costs shall be as provided in section 2414 and section
2517 of this title for the payment of judgments against the United States.
86. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. Id. at 1036.
88. Id.
89. 421 U.S. at 241.
90. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973). It must be noted that in both Newman
and Northcross the attorneys' fee awards were based on federal statutes which made
such awards discretionary with the court.
91. 421 U.S. at 269.
92. Id. at 271 n.47.
93. Id. at 260-62 & nn.33-35.
94. Id. at 249-50. However, as Justice Marshall indicated, when the Court had
wanted to avoid Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796), in the past it had
managed to do so. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 27882 (1975). See text accompanying notes 105-11 infra.
95. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970) (corresponds to Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch.
80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161).
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nature and amount of the taxable items of cost in the federal
courts." 9 The Court cited a 1796 decision, Arcambel v.
Wiseman,"7 for the position that the judiciary cannot, in contravention of American practice, create a general rule permitting recovery of attorneys' fees as damages without statutory
sanction. 8 Although Arcambel cited no authority for its position, subsequent decisions have usually accepted it as precedent on the point.9 Until 1800, federal courts were required by
statute to adopt the rules of the forum state in awarding attorneys' fees;' ° and the practice continued as a matter of custom
until 1853. At that time, Congress enacted a statute which was
intended to standardize the costs recoverable in federal litigation.'0 ' The Act provided as follows:
That in lieu of the compensation now allowed by law
to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors in the United States

courts to United States district attorneys, clerks of the

district and circuit courts, marshals, witnesses, jurors,

commissioners, and printers, in several states, the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed.
But this Act shall not be construed to prohibit attorneys,
solicitors, and proctors from charging to and receiving from
their clients, other than the Government, such reasonable
compensation for their services, in addition to the taxable
costs, as may be in accordance with general usage in their
respective states, or may be agreed upon between the parties.

02

Specific amounts were then listed for the services of attorneys,
solicitors and proctors.' 3 In 1948, the words "and no other com96.

421 U.S. at 252.

97. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
98. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975).
99. See F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116, 126-31
(1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18
(1967); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Ollrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
211 (1872); Flanders v. Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1852).
100. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-49 (1975).
101. Id. at 251 & n.24, citing the remarks of Sen. Bradbury, 27 CONG. GLOBE, 32d
Cong., 2d Sess. 207 (1853).
102. Act of February 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1920, 1923(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
103. Fees of Attorneys, Solicitors and Proctors. In a trial before a
jury, in civil and criminal causes, or before referees, or on a final hearing
in equity or admiralty, a docket fee of twenty dollars: Provided, That in
cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the libellant shall

282
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pensation shall be taxed and allowed" were dropped." °"
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Alyeska'05 asserted that the
majority had misinterpreted the earlier cases'016 and the Act of
1853;"11 Marshall also chided the Court for mistakenly relying
on Cofigressional silence "' in concluding that awarding fees to
attorneys under a private attorney general theory constitutes
usurpation of a legislative function. Citing illustrative cases,'° 9
he argued persuasively that the Court had often found its equitable powers broad enough to award fees without a statutory
directive when "overriding considerations indicate[d] the
need for such a recovery." 110 Justice Marshall concluded that
the federal courts have the inherent power to award attorneys'
recover less than fifty dollars, the docket fee of his proctor shall be but
ten dollars.
In cases at law, where judgment is rendered without a jury, ten
dollars, and five dollars where a cause is discontinued.
For scire facias and other proceedings on recognizances five dollars.
For each deposition taken and admitted as evidence in the cause, two
dollars and fifty cents.
A compensation of five dollars shall be allowed for the services rendered in cases removed from a district to a circuit court by writ of error
or appeal ....
Id. at 161-62.
104. Prior to this change, the wording had been slightly changed in the Revised
Statutes of 1874 although the fee schedule remained the same. No changes
were made
by the Judicial Code of 1911. Different section numbers and minor wording
changes
resulted when the Judicial Code became part of Title 28 U.S.C. in
1926. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 241 U.S. 240, 253-57 & nn.26-29
(1975). However, even though the limiting language was no longer part of the statute,
the majority
read it as if it were. This interpretation was based on the fact that "'the
function of
the Revisers of the 1948 Code was generally limited to that of consolidation
and codification. Consequently .....
no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed.'"
Id., quoting Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 (1972). Justice
Marshall thought that the construction of the 1853 Act in prior cases "would
suffice
to dispose of the court's argument" had the language still been present.
Since it was
not, it seemed "even less reasonable to read the fee statute as an uncompromising
bar
to equitable fee awards." Id. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Justice Brennan dissented in a separate opinion, stating his belief
that
federal equity courts have the power to award fees on a private attorney general
theory,
and that Alyeska was a "proper [case] for the exercise of that power." Id.
at 271-72
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 274-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 278-81.
108. Id. at 281-82.
109. Id. at 278-81, citing the following cases: Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 13
(1973);
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970); Fleischmann
Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Sprague v. Ticonic
Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 164-67 (1938); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535 (1881).
110. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1968).
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fees and that "the equities in this case support an award of
attorneys' fees against Alyeska.""'
Marshall conceded the difficulty of determining which actions are of sufficient public interest and import to justify feeshifting as a matter of equity, and offered tentative guidelines
which basically reiterate the factors listed in La Raza. Feeshifting, Marshall suggested, should occur when (1) the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily shared
by the general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's
pecuniary interest in the outcome, if any, would not normally
justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3) shifting that cost
to the defendant would effectively place it on a class that benefits from the litigation." 2
The majority's concern was with issues which Justice Marshall acknowledged but did not adequately resolve. The first
3
was the problem of "manageability.""' La Raza and other
cases indicated that implementation of a strong Congressional
policy" 4 justifies awards of attorneys' fees even without explicit
statutory authorization. Since any statute arguably represents
strong Congressional policy, the Alyeska Court reasoned that
it was not a proper function of the judiciary to evaluate legislative policies by permitting fee awards in actions based on selected statutes, while denying them to litigants relying on others. Further, if the courts chose to treat every statute as embodying a policy important enough to justify encouraging its
enforcement by awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs, surely plaintiffs who attempt to vindicate constitutional
5
rights would also be entitled to fees." The exception would
unquestionably swallow the rule.
Justice Marshall's method would force upon the Court precisely the task the majority sought to avoid: that of making
judgments about the merits of the policy being enforced, or in
the alternative, allowing fee-shifting in all statutory litigation." The difficulty of deciding whether Congressional policy
is being implemented by any particular litigation is well illustrated in the Alyeska case itself.
Although Justice Marshall believed that the public de111. 421 U.S. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 285.
Id. at 263-64 & n.39.
La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Aleyska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 (1975).
Id. at 264-67 & n.39.
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rived significant benefits from the A lyeska litigation," 7 Judges
Wilkey, MacKinnon and Robb, the dissenters in the court of
appeal, thought it was clear that the plaintiffs had been
"frustratingthe policy Congress considers highly desirable and
of the utmost urgency." ' 8 Nor could they believe that Americans caught up in a spiral of escalating fuel prices and dwindling supplies were consumed with a "warm glow of gratitude
to those public-spirited plaintiffs in the Alaska Pipeline
case.""'
An additional problem the Court would face if Marshall's
system were adopted is that of determining to whom the fees
should be shifted. The majority pointed out that in the typical
public interest case, the government or one of its agencies is the
primary defendant.' 2°
Section 2412, Title 28 of the United States Code,' 2' however, provides that costs may be awarded to a party prevailing
against the United States in "any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official . . . acting
in his official capacity," but "not the fees and expenses of
attorneys";'2 2 this has been held to bar an award of fees when
the government is an unsuccessful defendant unless there is
specific statutory authority to the contrary.' 23
Justice Marshall, who would shift the cost to the "class
that benefits,' 24 found that the Department of the Interior
bore "the legal responsibility for adopting a position later determined to be unlawful ' ' 21 and that consequently all United
States citizens had benefited from the litigation instigated by
the Alyeska plaintiffs. If the statute barred assessing the government,'2 Marshall reasoned that the class could be reached
by taxing costs to the Alyeska consortium, which would pass
them along to its consumers, part of the benefited group. As the
majority pointed out, however, by allowing fee-shifting only
117. Id. at 285-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Wilkey,
Circuit Judge, dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 &
n.39 (1975).
121. See note 85 supra.
122. Id.
123. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 265-68 (1975).
124. Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 285-86.
126. Justice Marshall was not convinced that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 foreclosed attorneys' fee awards against the United States in all cases. Id. at 287 n.9.
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"when the award could be said to impose the burden on those
who benefit from the enforcement of the law,""' Justice Marshall appeared to be advocating not a true private attorney
general rationale, but "an expanded version of the common
fund approach," which the Court found particularly inappropriate to "litigation in which the purported benefits accrue to
the general public": 28'
In this Court's common fund and common benefit
decisions, the class of beneficiaries was small in number
and easily identifiable. The benefits could be traced with
some accuracy, and there was reason for confidence that
the costs could indeed be shifted with some exactitude to
those benefitting. In this case, however, sophisticated economic analysis would be required to gauge the extent to
which the general public, the supposed beneficiaries, as
distinguished from selected elements of it, would bear the
costs. ,,9
Alyeska: In Defense of the Taxpayer?
It seems clear that neither the cases cited in the majority
opinion, the 1853 Act, nor Congressional silence, mandated the
Court's conclusion in Alyeska. Justice Marshall was clearly
correct that when "overriding considerations [had] indicated
the need" for awards of attorneys' fees in the past, the Court
had granted them.' 3 However, considering the present composition of the Court and the controversy surrounding the Alaskan pipeline, the decision was perhaps to be expected. No
doubt attempts will be made in the future to distinguish
Alyeska on the grounds that the plaintiff did not really prevail,
that the public interest was not clear-cut, and that the proper
defendant could not be taxed with the fees if they were
awarded.
Also, since the opinion seemed to focus on the fact that
statutes were involved, with the implication that Congress had
had a clear opportunity to provide for fee-shifting but had
elected not to do so, it could be argued that in a case dealing
with a constitutional right, the Court is still free to exercise its
equitable powers and allow fee-shifting. However, a footnote in
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 264-67 n.39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 274-80.
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the Alyeska opinion suggests that this Court does not want to
deal with the issue at all,' 3' and it does not seem likely that
such arguments will prevail in the near future.
The majority opinion made it clear that the Court did not
believe it proper to make the value judgments which would be
necessary if the private attorney general rationale were allowed
to develop further. There is little doubt that the average American citizen finds it hard to grasp that holding up construction
of various projects through environmental lawsuits necessarily
confers a benefit on the public. What he does understand, however, is that an oil supply remains untapped, or that congestion
on a highway cannot be relieved, or that new homes are not
built because some self-appointed guardian of his welfare is
determined to protect him from dangers of which he is not even
aware. With the present state of the economy, any delay in
such projects is certain to raise the final cost of construction
markedly when, after all the legal wrangling has ceased, the
project goes through-as it usually does. Even when such suits
are successful-the disputed environmental impact report is
submitted, the project is modified, the environmental damage
minimized-in most cases, it is not an achievement with which
the majority of the public can identify. The impact the citizen
recognizes is the necessity for paying increased construction
costs through higher prices or taxes; the fact that part of the
increase is in effect an assessment to pay the fees of the publicspirited attorneys who, indirectly at least, are responsible for
the higher prices or taxes is an irony he is not likely to appreciate. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the public will quietly
acquiesce in a practice it sees as an arrogant and badly camouflaged raid on its pocketbook.
It is submitted that this is the real reason that the Supreme Court denied attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in Alyeska:
not because the private attorney general theory presents problems of manageability, although it does; not because the Act
of 1853 forbids such an award, although the argument can be
made; not even because it is the legislature's right and duty to
deal with the problem of attorneys' fees, although it is at least
entitled to do so.
Instead, it seems that the Court has either disclaimed or
has chosen not to exercise the power to increase the cost to the
public for these controversial suits. Perhaps underlying the
131.

Id. at 270-71 n.46.
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Court's decision in Alyeska was the feeling that if the representatives of the people think the expense involved in public
interest lawsuits must be tolerated by citizens for the sake of
the benefits that ensue, then it is Congress that is going to have
to assume the burden of educating the public to accept that,
and to establish reasonable guidelines to prevent abuse of the
system.
Of course, judicial decisions that result in an increased
burden on the taxpayer are not unusual. Decisions requiring
34
3
desegregation and busing,'32 reapportionment,' labor' and
5 are obvious examples. One difference, howwelfare benefits,'
ever, is that such matters present constitutional issues and are
clearly within the traditional purview of the courts. It is not at
all clear that most environmental and consumer protection
problems can be so characterized; thus it might be argued that
cost factors are a legitimate consideration and may indeed outweigh other interests, especially when the interest asserted is
merely the equitable right to be compensated for the expense
of conferring a possible benefit on the public.
In any event, the immediate impact of Alyeska seems
clear: where the "purported benefit" accrues to the general
public rather than to a limited, identifiable class, the federal
courts will permit awards of attorneys' fees on a private attorney general rationale only where such awards are specifically
authorized by statute.
THE NEED FOR FEE-SHIFTING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

The Problems
Although Alyeska was an environmental case, the Supreme Court left no doubt that the principle enunciated is
132. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Johnson v. Combs,
471 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1972); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 892 (1972); Beckett v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408 (1970); Gonzales v. FairfaxBrewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
133. See, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
942 (1972); Seniock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970); Dyer v. Love, 307 F.
Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Miss. 1966).
134. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Gartner v. Soloner, 384 F.2d 348
(3d Cir. 1967); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Blankenship v. Boyle, 79 L.R.R.M. 2183 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Burch v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 78 L.R.R.M. 2442 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
135. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Millington, 476 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1973); Ojeda
v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1922); Gaddis v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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applicable to public interest litigation generally.
Despite the difficulties inherent in any attempt to sketch
the parameters of the class, a noted commentator has gamely
attempted a working definition of "public interest litigation."
It is, he says, the type of suit that is
not aimed at resolving private differences between the
named plaintiff and the named defendant . . . [but] is
brought by private plaintiffs in the hope of achieving
broader results by litigating issues of extreme current importance which when resolved will affect substantial numbers of people.' 36
Such litigation is by its very nature complex, time-consuming,
and consequently expensive. It is neither rational nor proper
under such circumstances to expect an individual who cannot
hope to recover his expenses to press a suit, even though he and
others are faced with a loss of a right if no suit is brought.137
Therefore, if public interest litigation is to survive, except perhaps as an avocation of the wealthy, it must be subsidized.
Thus far, this type of litigation has been funded almost
exclusively by foundations or the government (through legal
aid organizations), a method that has proved inadequate. During the fiscal years 1971, 1972 and 1973, the budget of the Office
of Legal Services remained the same, while inflation alone increased costs 13.4 percent; 38 the total cost increase was such
that in 1973, the Office of Legal Services needed an additional
$15 million to maintain its 1971 level of operation.' 39 Further,
the private foundations which have supplied substantial funds
for public interest litigation never intended to support pro bono
firms indefinitely. Initial support was predicated on the as136. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV.
301, 305 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Nussbaum].
137. [S]uch litigation normally seeks only injunctive and declaratory relief, not damages. Therefore, rarely will an individual-even a
wealthy individual-be likely to seek out and pay counsel to commence
costly litigation to vindicate, not his own private rights, but widely
shared public rights. In other words, any single individual's interest in
the enforcement of broad public rights is normally diffused in the public
interest. In these circumstances it is not rational for any person to attempt to capture his or her minute portion of the aggregate good by using
personal funds to pay the full cost of enforcing the mutual right.
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 801 (Statement of J. Anthony Kline, Esq., Public
Advocates, Inc.).
138. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 847 (statement of Dean E. Clinton Bamberger, Catholic University Law School).
139. Id.
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sumption that such firms would eventually generate sufficient
funds to continue alone. Consequently, it is expected that
much of the foundation support will be withdrawn within the
next few years.' 4 There are very few private practitioners who
handle large scale pro bono cases because of the necessary commitment of time and money.
Ironically, the defendant in a public interest case is
usually a branch of the state or federal government, or a large
corporation. Taxpayers are already paying for all of the government's legal expenses, even when it loses. What much of the
public doesn't realize, however, is that it is also paying for
nearly 50 percent of a corporation's legal expenses-reasonable
or not-because that proportion of legal fees can be deducted
by the corporation as a necessary business expense.' 4 ' Even a
pro bono firm funded by a foundation usually cannot match the
funds which its opponents can spend, and adequate presentation of the issues often hinges upon relatively equal financial
resources. It seems fundamental that
the vindication of important legal rights should not depend
upon the beneficence of private philanthropy or be subject
to the whim of government. Nor should it be made to depend upon the noblesse oblige of the occasional attorney
who may be willing to provide representation without
fee. 142
It is particularly unreasonable to deny fees to a plaintiff
who is, in effect, enforcing government policy by bringing a law
suit to require compliance with a statute or the Constitution.
Without some provision for fee-shifting in such cases, the law
frequently confers a paper right only. 43
140. Id. at 853 (statement of Joseph N. Onek, Esq., Director, Center for Law and
Social Policy).
141. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162 establishes the right to deduct all ordinary
and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on any trade or business. Legal expenses

are included within this category. These not only include the fees paid to lawyers, but
also fees and expenses of accountants, witnesses, or other persons involved in the
preparation of the taxpayer's position, court costs, stenographic and printing charges.
1 CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1348.
142. Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 800 (statement of J. Anthony Kline, Esq.).
For an illustration of the different resources of the parties in La Raza, see id. at 799.
In discussing the discrepancy in resources, a civil rights lawyer stated, " 'the school
boards pay their lawyers, win, lose, or draw, day in and day out and yet we are on our
own and we are to do the work of the Nation.' "Id. at 857 (statement of Joseph Onek).
143. Id. at 860-61 (statement of Armand Derfner, Esq., Lawyers' Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law).
When Congress calls upon a private citizen to enforce its mandates,
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Some Solutions
While attempts may be made to minimize the adverse
impact of Alyeska by expanding the established "bad faith"
and "common fund" exceptions to the no-fees rule, " experience indicates that such a course is not likely to prove a satisfactory solution. Even where fee-shifting historically has been
available, whether by statute providing for "reasonable" (but
unspecified) fees or by virtue of one of the judicially created
exceptions, appellate courts, aware of the problems involved in
evaluating the factors pertinent to a determination of a reasonable fee, have traditionally given the trial courts wide discretion in setting the appropriate amount. An allowance usually
will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion
can be shown.' 45 The result has been wide variation in the actual-as opposed to theoretical-availability of fee awards, and
in the amount of the award itself.
Factors which are often considered in determining the fee
are the nature, extent and difficulty of the legal services rendered; time devoted to the matter; loss of opportunity for other
employment; the ability and professional standing of the attorney; the amount involved and the responsibility assumed; the
contingency of compensation and the hazards of litigation; the
results and benefits obtained; the losing litigant's ability to
pay; and the customary charges for similar services in the same
Congress simply cannot expect that citizen to become an unpaid law
enforcement official, especially when those who are most often responsible for violations, government officials and corporations, have their legal
defenses subsidized.
The government-local, state or federal-which violates the law has
resources which the private citizen could never hope to accrue-resources
which, unfortunately, it often spends hindering rather than furthering the
public interest. Why should the public subsidize violations of the law of
the land while the private citizen must pay to vindicate public policy?
Government, by virtue of almost unlimited funds, is already in an advantageous position; if attorneys' fees are denied the private citizen who
brings suit to force his local, state or federal government to obey the law,
government violators of the law are beyond reach.
Id. at 861. See also La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
144. See text accompanying notes 40-55 supra, for a discussion of these exceptions. It should be noted, however, that the Alyeska court apparently attempted to
short-circuit any such attempt with its comments on the application of the commonfund theory. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 264-67 n.39
(1975).
145. See Harrison v. Bloomfield Bldg. Indus., Inc., 435 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir.
1970).
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locality. 4 ' This elaborate list of factors that have been considered in various cases indicates that some firm guidelines are
necessary if any uniformity is to be achieved in attorney fee
awards.
The need for uniform standards is particularly pressing in
the public interest area of litigation. All too often, the recompense theoretically available to a victorious pro bono plaintiff
is not forthcoming; even where they are permitted by statute,
frequently only minimal fees are awarded. It would appear that
many judges feel that plaintiffs' attorneys handling pro bono
publico cases should be happy to donate their time to a worthy
cause. 4' As justification for its inadequate award of fees, one
court declared that since the attorney's services were "imposed" on clients who hadn't contracted for them, "their fees
may properly be less than those they could have received by
entering the marketplace and selling their services to the pri48
vate client who would make the highest bid for them."' Also,
when counsel is from a legal aid society or a firm supported by
a foundation or private funds, as most attorneys who do a
significant amount of public interest litigation are, many
courts seem to believe that an award of fees is unnecessary or
inappropriate. It has been suggested that such non-profit organizations may not accept fees even if they are awarded, and
such reasoning has been used to deny altogether an award of
4
fees theoretically available. ' What these practices do, of
course, is further reduce the number of attorneys willing to
handle public interest cases, since the loss in time, money, and
146. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 13, 20-46 (1957) for lists of cases going to these
points; e.g., Los Angeles v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms Co., 134 Cal. App. 268, 25 P.2d
224 (1933).
147. See, e.g., Trout v. Carleson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 337, 340-41, 112 Cal. Rptr. 282,
284 (1974), where plaintiff was represented by an attorney from California Rural Legal
Assistance (CRLA) in an action against the Director of the California State Dep't of
Public Welfare. Attorneys' fees were provided under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §
10962 (West 1972). Based on the Imperial County Bar Association minimum fee schedule, the CRLA attorney requested $700.00. The trial judge stated:
I am not going to be probably as generous as I frankly might if it were
some private group. I don't know, but I feel that under the circumstances,
that $20.00 an hour is sufficient, and so I will award $400.00.
Trout v. Carleson, supra.
148. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1339 (1st Cir.
1973). See also Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in
part & rev'd in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974).
149. E.g., Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1252-53 (N.D. Ga.
1971); see Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees to Legal Aid Offices, 87 HARV. L. REv. 411
(1973), for a thorough discussion of this problem.
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even future business becomes prohibitive.'5 °
The most appropriate method of assuring equity and conformity in the area of public interest litigation fee-shifting is
for the legislature to provide authorization and guidelines by
statute.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Drafting a statute which will equitably resolve the many
problems connected with attorneys' fees in public interest litigation will not be an easy task; but in light of Alyeska, it is
obvious that any real change in the traditional American rule
in the federal courts will have to come from Congress. The
repercussions already apparent in both federal'"' and state'52
courts demonstrate that some type of legislation is a necessity
if public interest litigation is to have any real meaning in our
society,' 53 and if access to legal solutions for vexing problems
is to be freely available to good faith litigants.'54
A number of proposals have been made, among them the
adoption of a statutory scheme resembling the British system,
previously described,'55 which routinely provides for feerecovery by successful litigants. There appears to be almost no
support for such a move, since the English fee-shifting procedure is impractical and unwieldy; nor has its American cousin,
the Alaskan system, been well received,'56 as the broad discretion vested in the trial judge has triggered an avalanche of
appeals. Indeed, the attorneys' fee award has become the most
frequently appealed issue in the state."7
150. Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 855, 859 (testimony of Armand and Mary
Frances Derfner).
151. E.g., Muhammad Temple of Islam v. City of Shreveport, 517 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1975); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251, 1267-69 (5th Cir. 1975);
Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 636-38 (5th Cir. 1975); Turner v. F.C.C., 514 F.2d 1354,
1356 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
152. See Menge v. Farmers Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 3d 143, 123 Cal. Rptr. 265
(1975) & discussion accompanying notes 208-16 infra.
153. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 855-56.
154. Free access does not have to mean more litigation, clogged court calendars
and long delays. "Access is important as a bargaining chip in settlement negotiations,
and equal ability to threaten trial tends to equalize the bargaining relationship."
Comment, Equal Access, supra note 2, at 670 n.210.
155. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
157. Comment, Attorney's Fees in Alaska, supra note 26, at 130 n.7, 145.
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Proposed Federal Statute
The first significant attempt to find a partial legislative
solution to the attorneys' fee problem has been made in the
civil rights area, where attorneys' fees have frequently been
awarded in the past. ' When such fees have not been provided
for by statute, the courts have been quite willing to rely on their
inherent equitable powers to grant them in order to encourage
those injured by various forms of discrimination to seek judicial
relief.' 9 Recently, a bill was introduced in the Senate which
would authorize attorneys' fees, at the court's discretion, in all
actions brought under sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981
of the United States Code,' 60 or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.161 In the remarks which preceded the introduction of
the bill, Senator John V. Tunney stated that fees had not specifically been authorized in all the civil rights laws because "it
was widely believed and held that the courts already had the
power to award counsel fees . . .as part of their inherent equity power."' 62 The Alyeska decision, however, made it necessary to provide statutory authorization to "maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee-shifting in these cases." ' 63
This bill may be seriously inadequate even for its limited
purposes, however, because it does not specify that fees may be
awarded against the United States. Those statutes which do
presently provide for award of attorneys' fees as costs in the
civil rights area state that "the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person.""4' ' The Alyeska Court's
insistence on clear guidance from the legislature suggests that,
faced with the omission of similar words in this bill, the Court
would not assess fees against the United States.
158. E.g., Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968); Hill v.
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968); Bell v. School Bd., 321
F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Dyer v. Love, 307 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
159. Lyle v. Teresi, 327 F. Supp. 683, 685 (D. Minn. 1971).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1981-83, 1985-86 (1952).
161. S. 2278, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) proposes to amend Revised Statutes §
722, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of Section 1977,
1978, 1979, 1980 and 1981 of the Revised Statutes, or Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs.
162. 121 CONG. REC. S 14975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975).
163. Id. at S 14976.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1964).
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In addition, the bill's broad grant of discretionary power
to the trial court, coupled with the lack of any guidelines and
the volume of civil rights and Title VI litigation, threatens a
repetition in the civil rights area of the Alaska experience.
Private Attorney General Statute
A prominent public interest attorney has suggested to the
Senate subcommittee studying attorneys' fees that it would be
"appropriate for the Congress to provide guidelines for the
exercise" of reasonable judicial discretion in awarding fees "to
successful private attorneys general who, in effectuating legislative policies and constitutional rights, have conferred substantial benefits on the public." He emphasized that such
guidelines ought to ensure that public interest attorneys are
allowed fees which are "commensurate with the fees obtained
by private lawyers in the vicinity in comparable litigation."''
While a private attorney general statute broadly authorizing
fee-shifting in "public benefit" situations might well be an
acceptable solution, the Alyeska Court clearly expressed its
disinclination to make the kind of value judgments implicit in
defining terms like "substantial benefit." The Supreme Court
has pointedly passed that particular ball back to Congress.
A "'Procedural"Statute
A system not hampered by these difficulties was recently
proposed by a legal commentator. Recognizing that most
schemes for authorizing attorneys' fees in public interest litigation require the court to make a subjective evaluation of arguably competing policies, the author recommends that any plaintiff found to be representing a "relevant policy position . . .
not normally represented before the court," be awarded fees
"regardless of whether the party [is] successful on the merits,
[and] regardless of any benefit that might result apart from
full and fair representation."'' 6 The subjective element would
be essentially eliminated; "relevance" should not be a difficult
determination, and "public interest litigation" in this context
would be defined simply as "representation of an otherwise
inadequately represented policy position . . . formulated to
promote an interest which will be affected by the decision to
165.
Esq.).
166.

Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 794, 805 (statement of Anthony J. Kline,
Comment, Equal Access, supra note 2, at 675.
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be made."' 6 7 Thus fee awards would become entirely a procedural matter.
Since access to the courts is an important element of
political power, the implementation of this system would benefit the public at large by insuring that all significant points of
view on an issue were well-represented, thus making it more
likely that the court would be provided with a range of information conducive to sound decision making.'68 In order to prevent
duplication of effort, the author suggested one restriction: that
fees be allowed only where public enforcement is inadequate.
Some statutes clearly are intended to be enforced by private
actions; thus it seems only equitable to provide attorneys' fees
to one who is, by necessity, assuming the law enforcement responsibilities of the government.' 9 Even when the implementation of a statute is nominally left to the government, it is
obvious that such a task is frequently too great to be handled
effectively by the designated public agency. 7 ' Therefore, a private plaintiff would be entitled to attorneys' fees when, in actual practice, government enforcement is inadequate. 7 ' Furthermore, in such cases the fees should properly come from a
public fund, rather than a private defendant, since the private
plaintiff is in effect assisting the government, which has primary responsibility to enforce the laws.'7 2
Since the goal of the procedural theory is adequate representation of all relevant points of view on an issue, whether or
not the plaintiff "prevails" should not be the crucial factor, as
long as the "suit has served to further public policy goals or
[to] educate the court."'7 However, the court should have
167. Id. at 675 & n.231, citing Comment, Public Participationin FederalAdministrative Proceedings, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 702, 731 (1972).
168. Id. at 678.
169. Id. at 671, 677-78.
170. Id. at 677. In dealing with a similar problem on the issue of standing, then
Judge Burger of the D.C. Circuit stated:
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the
listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private
attorneys general is one of those assumptions we collectively try to work
with so long as they are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as
it does to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands
up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the Commission can continue to rely upon it.
Office of Communication v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
171. Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 856.
172. Comment, Equal Access, supra note 2, at 671-72.
173. Id. at 675 (footnote omitted).
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power to decline to award fees when the suit is frivolous,' 7 ' or
when the public interest issue is a "purely incidental element
in the context of the case and merely serves as a tangential
boot-strap to recovery of costs."' 75 Of course, the court already
has and should retain the inherent power to deny fees if a party
acts in bad faith.
An additional advantage of the procedural system is that
the fee-shifting factors could feasibly be examined and evaluated at a pre-trial hearing. The court could make an initial
ruling on the "relevance" and "representation" questions, thus
indicating whether fees would be awarded at the conclusion of
the trial and consequently lessening the plaintiff's financial
risk. The actual amount of the fee award, based on the difficulty of the case and the time and skill involved in the litigation, would be determined after trial.
The CharitableDeduction Proposal
A much different proposal calls for a statute which would
allow professionals to take a charitable deduction for the pro
bono work they do.'76 At the present time, the Internal Revenue
Service interprets section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954' 71 as restricting charitable deductions to donations of
money, not services.' 78 It has been suggested that if section
170(c) were amended, and certain limitations established, 78
private law firms would find it very advantageous to represent
pro bono clients. 80
The main drawback is the fact that not all clients with a
public interest suit could qualify as charitable organizations
under section 174(a).181 Therefore a plaintiff who qualified
174. Id.
175. King & Plater, supra note 2, at 66.
176. Baird, Charitable Deductions for Pro Bono Publico Professional Services:
An Updated Carrot and Stick Approach, 50 TEx. L. REV. 441 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Baird].
177. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c).
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2(a)(2) (1958). Congress has never clearly called for such
an interpretation; nevertheless, the Treasury Department has maintained this posture
since 1920. Baird, supra note 176, at 443 & nn.14-15.
179. It could be required that eligibility of the organization be determined by
whether or not it worked in "a congressionally selected national problem area, such as
poverty or pollution." Baird, supra note 176, at 444-45. Services by lawyers and other
professionals which could be deducted would have to be restricted to those for which
one needs a license, or for which the donor regularly is paid. Id. at 445 & n.26.
180. Id. at 443.
181. At the present time, charitable deductions must be limited to a charitable
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under the liberalized standing requirements to bring the suit
might in actual practice be unable to do so unless he could find
a qualified organization to pursue the suit, and thus induce a
firm looking for a charitable deduction to undertake the litigation.
The charitable deduction plan is an attempt to avoid federal funding and the strings which tend to accompany federal
funds. One of the major problems faced by the legal aid organizations funded by the OEO-other than the constant problem
of inadequate funding"' 2-is the pressure frequently exerted by
members of Congress and the administration when the cases
brought by the public interest groups receiving funds involve
causes unpopular with middle-class constituents and politicians." 3 To prevent the same type of pressure from being applied under the charitable deduction system, it would be necessary to expand the definition of charitable organization to encompass environmental and consumer groups, without requiring them to abandon their lobbying efforts to advance consumer and environmental causes through legislation. 4 It
would be difficult to formulate an amendment to section 170(c)
broad enough to effect this purpose, but limited enough to
avoid creating the kind of loophole the current restriction is
designed to avoid. Without a broader definition of "charitable
organization," however, it is hard to see how the charitable
deduction theory could generate the representation needed in
the public interest area.
A Combination of Theories
Although the fee-shifting concept has numerous
proponents, there is no consensus as to the best way to implement it. Perhaps the first and most elementary requirement is
that Congress establish guidelines for determining when a lawsuit brought by a private party is in the "public interest." The
organization as described under section 170(c)-i.e., one "operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes or for the prevention
of cruelty to children or animals." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § i70(c)(2)(B).
182. Baird, supra note 176, at 442 n.6.
183. Id. at 442 & nn.7-8.
184. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c)(2)(D) states:
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
public office.
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''procedural" proposal offers the most liberal standard and is
also the one which reduces to a minimum the kind of subjective
value judgments which the Alyeska court found inappropriate
and unmanageable. Furthermore, it seems to promise that
equal access to the courts would become a reality and not
merely a pleasant platitude. A plaintiff who can be assured of
recovering his expenses as long as he is asserting a "relevent
policy position

.

.

.

not normally represented before the court"

will almost certainly have adequate encouragement to pursue
a legitimate claim in which his personal financial stake is
small.
Next, the reasonableness of the traditional rule that only
a victorious plaintiff may recover should be re-examined. The
plaintiff should not have to prevail in order to be reimbursed,
as long as the litigation produces positive results which derive
from plaintiff's participation.'85 The procedural system would
replace the "prevailing plaintiff" standard, which looks only to
a narrow end result, with a "meritoriousness"'' s standard focusing "upon the therapeutic result of the various facets of the
litigation both in terms of the instant case and beyond.""'7 If
this standard were adopted, attorneys' fees could be awarded
even if the case became moot, or was settled, or the plaintiff
lost on the merits, as long as the intervention by the plaintiff
seryed to halt conduct not in the public interest-conduct forbidden by a statute, for example.
This flexible notion of meritoriousness recognizes that
the Congressional purpose is equally well served where an
acceptable public project moves forward after forced compliance with the minimum statutory safeguards, as where
an unsound project is stopped. Where either result is a
product of an exercise of the legal process, the requisite
degree of success on the merits has been demonstrated.'
A third key decision is selection of an appropriate method
of funding awards of attorneys' fees. In light of the large percentage of public interest cases in which the government is the
defendant, it is crucial that section 2412 be changed to permit
fee-assessment against the government.' If a public fund is
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

King & Plater, supra note 2, at 81.
Id. at 78-79.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 791 (testimony of J. Anthony Kline, Esq.).
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established to cover public interest attorneys' fees, it would
seem that section 2412 would no longer be viable in any event.
The public fund approach might also have the advantage of
making fees available to attorneys during the research and
preparation of the case. Since the expenses of such litigation
are very high, pro bono attorneys often find themselves having
to eliminate issues and forego expensive but vital research during the preparation of the case because, even if fees are
awarded at termination, they have insufficient funds with
which to do the initial work.""0 It has been suggested that a fund
be established which would provide loans to pro bono lawyers
to finance the proper preparation of their cases, which could be
repaid out of the fee award.'"' A pre-trial determination that a
plaintiff would be awarded fees at the conclusion of the trial
would tend to make such plaintiffs good credit risks for this
type of loan.'2
The fees that are awarded must adequately compensate
attorneys who represent public interest clients. A schedule
based on the damages awarded would probably be unacceptable since there frequently is no monetary recovery, or only a
nominal one. However, leaving the decision completely to the
court's discretion is also unacceptable, as the Alaskan experience has demonstrated. Though any schedule of factors would
necessarily have an element of arbitrariness,"' the number of
hours involved in the litigation and comparable fees charged by
attorneys in the private sector would have to weigh heavily in
the computation of an award. If adequate compensation is not
forthcoming, it is not likely that public interest actions will be
pursued with much vigor in the future. The courts have shown
190. Id. at 834, 838-40 (testimony of Dennis Flannery, Esq.).
191. Id. at 842.
192. See text following note 179 supra.
193. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2, DR 2-106 (1975)
lists 8 factors which are to be considered in determining a reasonable fee:
1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
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their willingness to award substantial fees in antitrust and securities litigation; an equally sympathetic judicial attitude
toward public interest litigation, and an effective statute which
authorized fee awards, would probably provide much-needed
encouragement in this vital area.
Finally, it would be helpful to require an official declaration by the judge indicating how he determined the fee award.
This would, hopefully, tend to eliminate arbitrary treatment,
to promote consistency in awards, and to reduce the number
of appeals over the size of the award.
CALIFORNIA: STATUS AND POTENTIAL

Section 1021 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
states that unless attorneys' fees are provided for by statute, it
is left to the attorney and client to agree on a fee and method
of payment." 4 This comports with the traditional American
rule. The nonstatutory common fund and substantial benefit
exceptions are also firmly established in California; the bad
faith and private attorney general doctrines, however, have
never been approved by the California Supreme Court.
In a 1968 case, Fletcherv. A. J. Industries,' 5 the California
Court of Appeal, relying on the substantial benefit theory
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank,'" awarded attorneys' fees to a plaintiff
who had successfully settled a pending stockholders derivative
action.' 7 The Fletcher court concluded-as the United States
Supreme Court had in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. '5 -that
even though no fund had been created, the court's equitable
powers allowed it to do justice between the plaintiff and those
benefiting from his litigation, by awarding plaintiff attorneys'
fees.' 99 The fact that the benefits were achieved by settlement
194. Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors
at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but
parties to actions or proceedings are entitled to costs and disbursements,
as hereinafter provided.
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1021 (West 1955).
195. 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
196. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). Sprague was an extension of the common fund idea.
Although petitioner represented only herself, her actions served to establish the claims
of 14 other persons as well. Consequently it was proper to award attorneys' fees. Id. at
166-67.
197. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 322, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
198. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
199. 266 Cal. App. 2d at 323, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
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rather than full litigation, the court held, was immaterial. 200
However, attempts to persuade the California Supreme
Court to adopt the bad faith and private attorney general theories have not been successful. In D'Amico v. Board of Medical
Examiners,2°1 the court restricted itself to ruling that the common fund and substantial benefit doctrines were inapplicable
to the facts. 01 2 It refused to decide if it had the power to award
fees to one party as a sanction for vexatious and oppressive
conduct on the part of another party or opposing counsel; 2"' nor
would it consider the private attorney general theory, which at
that time was being reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court in Bradley v. Richmond School Board."4 The court
stated that "pending an announcement by the high court concerning [the] limits and contours [of the private attorney
general theory] on the federal level, we decline to consider its
possible application in this state." ' 5
However, in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation
Commission,"'0 a recent environmental protection case, the
California court indicated that it would be willing to consider
the private attorney general theory under appropriate circumstances. In Bozung, the successful plaintiffs made a motion to
the California Supreme Court to recover attorneys' fees incurred on appeal, based on the private attorney general
theory. 071 Although the court refused to grant the fees, it remanded the issue to the trial court for full briefing and oral
argument, instructing the trial judge, if he decided plaintiffs
were entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees, to fix the amount.
The trial court's ruling would, of course, then be subject to
review on appeal. 0
The Bozung case was decided in February, 1975, and
Alyeska in May of 1975. In July, the California Court of Appeal
for the Second District, Division 4, considered both cases in
reaching its decision in Menge v. Farmers Insurance Group,2 "'
200. Id. at 325, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
201. 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1974).
202. Id. at 25-26, 520 P.2d at 28, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
203. Id. at 26-27, 520 P.2d at 28-29, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 804-05.
204. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
205. 11 Cal. 3d 1, 27, 520 P.2d 10, 29, 112 'Cal. Rptr. 786, 805 (1974).
206. 13 Cal. 3d 483, 531 P.2d 783, 119 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1975).
207. Id. at 484, 531 P.2d at 784, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
208. Id. at 485, 531 P.2d at 784, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 216. On the same day, a similar
instruction was given in No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 486, 531 P.2d
784, 119 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975).
209. 50 Cal. App. 3d 143, 123 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

a class action seeking to enjoin the distribution of insurance
solicitation materials alleged to be inaccurate and misleading.
After 11 months of proceedings, plaintiffs obtained the relief
sought through a stipulated judgment."" They requested attorneys' fees under the private attorney general and substantial
benefit doctrines." The issue with which the appeals court was
presented was whether an equity court could award fees to
plaintiffs' attorney in a class action where no fund had been
created, and, although the litigation was responsible for some
benefit to the defendant,"' "the special status of a corporate
shareholder plaintiff [did] not exist. 213
When presented with a similar issue in April, 1975, in
People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Bosio,14 the
Court of Appeal for the Second District, Division 3, had followed the example set by the California Supreme Court in
Bozung and remanded the question to the trial court for decision."1 ' The Menge court, however, considered only the fact
that the California Supreme Court in Bozung and the court of
appeal in Bosio had not awarded attorneys' fees, declining to
acknowledge that in each case the question of awarding fees
had been remanded to the trial court. It denied attorneys' fees
on two bases: the Alyeska decision (which post-dated Bosio),
and the "reluctance" of the California Supreme Court to establish the private attorney general theory in this state. ' ,
A Pending Decision: Serrano v. Priest
It is possible that the supreme court will resolve the issue
in the near future. The complex case of Serrano v. Priest,"7
dealing with the constitutionality of the California system of
school financing, is once more before the court, this time with
an appeal on the issue of attorneys' fees consolidated with the
210. Id. at 144, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
211. Id. at 148, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
212. The trial court found that the benefit was the possible prevention of numerous lawsuits against the insurance company when people realized that they had not
received the insurance coverage that the solicitation material had offered. Since it
determined that no award of fees was appropriate, the court of appeal did not decide
whether this benefit was analogous to the benefit recognized in Fletcher. Id.
213. Id. at 148, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 268.
214. 47 Cal. App. 3d 495, 121 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1975).
215. Id. at 531-32, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
216. 50 Cal. App. 3d 143, 148, 123 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (1975).
217. Serrano v. Priest, #L.A. 30398, Cal. S. Ct. (1975).

1976]

AFTER ALYESKA

appeal on the merits." 's The fee appeal raises issues concerning
the availability in California of judicially awarded attorneys'
fees under the private attorney general doctrine, or the common fund and substantial benefit theories.
The court might find that the common fund or substantial
benefit theories are sufficiently broad or can be expanded to
allow attorneys' fees in Serrano; or it may deny fees entirely,
or in some other way avoid resolving the private attorney general question at this time. However, the court's prior decisions
in many areas of the law"' suggest that fees will be granted,
and since the facts of Serrano do meet the frequently stated
standards for the private attorney general theory, it seems
likely that the court will face the issue squarely now.
Indications of the Court's Receptiveness to Change
There is no appellate court decision explicitly approving
the private attorney general theory in California. However, a
number of factors strongly suggest that when the supreme
court does deal with the issue, it will adopt the doctrine.
First, both the legislature and the courts of California have
a good record for protecting the interests of its citizens in precisely those areas which generate the most public interest litigation. The courts have, for instance, vigorously enforced the
state's consumer protection laws, repeatedly stressing that protection of "unwary consumers. . . is an exigency of the utmost
priority." 2 " In Morgan v. Reasor Corp.,2' construing a section
of the Unruh Act" that deals with attorneys' fees, the supreme
court emphasized that the legislative intent had been to "encourage attorneys to accept cases when the buyer has a good
defense against an action instituted by the seller or holder or
when the buyer wishes to institute an action for such rights as
218. Hearingson S.B. 664 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on Private
Attorneys General, 1975-76 Cal. Leg. Sess., at 80-81 (1975) (testimony of Armando
Menocal, Esq.) [hereinafter cited as California Hearings].
219. See text accompanying notes 220-45 infra.
220. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808; 484 P.2d 964, 968, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800 (1971). In Vasquez, the court held that a consumer class action could
be brought for rescission of installment contracts for fraudulent misrepresentation
against both the seller and the finance company to which the contracts were assigned.
Id. at 805, 484 P.2d at 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798. See also Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67
Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1971).
221. 69 Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968).
222. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1811.1 (West 1973).
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he may have." 2 3 Defendants argued that the section was applicable only in an action "on a contract," and since the plaintiff was requesting declaratory relief, the award of fees was
improper.22 The court concluded, however, that such an interpretation would unduly restrict the application of the Act and
was not consistent with legislative history.225 The award of attorneys' fees was affirmed."
In the environmental area, California has declared it state
policy to "take all action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and
enhance environmental quality of the state."2 7 Accordingly,
the supreme court has held that the key piece of environmental
legislation, the Environmental Quality Act of 1970,2 must be
construed to provide the broadest possible protection of the
environment.2 '
The courts have acted to provide the fullest possible protection within the reasonable scope of statutory language in
other "public interest" areas as well. Welfare and Institutions
Code section 10962230 gives a welfare applicant the right to obtain a court hearing to review a decision made by the Director
of the State Department of Social Welfare.23 ' If the applicant
prevails, section 10962 allows reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs. In Silberman v. Swoap, 32 the applicant filed a writ of
mandate to compel the Director to issue his decision on the
applicant's claim. The Director argued that a mandamus proceeding was not within the scope of the governing statute and
223. 69 Cal. 2d at 896-97, 447 P.2d at 648-49, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
224. Id. at 896, 447 P.2d at 648, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
225. Id. at 897, 447 P.2d at 649, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
226. Id.
227. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West Supp. 1975).
228. Id. et seq.
229. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259, 502 P.2d
1049, 1054, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1972). Mammoth dealt with the question of
whether the Environmental Quality Act applied to private activities for which a permit
is required. One of the main features of the statute is the requirement of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for any project where a permit from the government is
required, if the project may have a significant effect on the environment. CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21151 (West Supp. 1975). Since there was no definition of "project" in
the statute, and a single meaning was not apparent on its face, the court held that it
was "required to give it [the statute] an interpretation with which it was passed."
The court found that the legislative intent necessitated that it interpret "project" to
apply to private as well as public activities. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra at 256, 259, 502 P.2d at 1054, 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 766, 768.
230. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 10962 (West 1972).
231. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1975).
232. 50 Cal. App. 3d 568, 123 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1975).
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thus fees should not be awarded. 33 However, the court concluded that the reason for providing attorneys' fees under section 10962 was to enable a needy person to "establish through
judicial proceedings his or her right to a statutory benefit.""23
Since the remedy pursued by the petitioner was made necessary by the Director's inaction, and since a "statute should not
' the court
be construed as creating a right without a remedy,"235
found that the award comported with the spirit and purpose of
the statutory provision.23
The court has been equally receptive when presented with
public interest cases not brought on statutory grounds. For
2
instance, in Knoff V. City and County of San Francisco,

a

class action to force changes in the property assessment system, the California Supreme Court found that "the award of
attorneys' fees and the details thereof were proper exercises of
the trial court's broad equitable powers, of which the existence
of an actual fund of money is not a condition precedent." 3 '
More recently, in Mandel v. Hodges,239 the court of appeal

affirmed an award of attorneys' fees under the substantial benefit theory. Plaintiff, a state employee, brought suit to challenge the state practice of giving state employees time off with
pay on Good Friday. In holding the practice unconstitutional,
the court of appeal also declared that plaintiff was entitled to
recover attorneys' fees because "1) the suit [was] one in which
the court's equitable powers [came] into play; 2) it [was]
commenced and maintained as a representative action; and 3)
it result[ed] in a disposition that confer[red] substantial
benefits, pecuniary or otherwise, upon the persons represented."240 The court found that the benefit to the public-in
this case the funds which would no longer be expended for work
not performed by state employees-was not "materially distinguishable from the benefits received by the corporation in
Fletcher . . .and by the taxpayers in Knoff .

. . .

Although the court of appeal mentioned Alyeska's repudiation of the private attorney general concept on the federal
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 570, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
Id. at 571, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
Id.
Id.
1 Cal. App. 3d 184, 81 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969).
Id. at 203, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976).
Id. at 622, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
Id.at 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62.
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level, it clearly did not consider the decision binding on a state
court. Nevertheless, the court found that it was precluded from
applying the private attorney general theory in Mandel because the California Supreme Court had thus far declined to
approve the concept.242
Perhaps the broadest language used by the California Supreme Court on a public interest issue was in People v.
Superior Court (Jayhill).4 3 Construing a statute that empowered the attorney general to enjoin false and misleading advertising, the court held that in addition to issuing the injunction,
it had the inherent power to order the defendant to make or
offer to make restitution to defrauded customers, as ancillary
relief. In the absence of a restriction stated "in so many words
or by a necessary or inescapable inference" '4 4 in the statute
itself, "a court of equity is entitled to exercise the full range of
its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice"24 '
between the parties.
Jayhill, like many of the cases cited in this section, was not
concerned with attorneys' fees. But the principle for which it
stands, together with the courts' commitment to giving as
broad a reading as is reasonable to statutes meant to protect
citizens' rights and enhance the quality of their lives, gives the
California Supreme Court a solid basis for utilizing the private
attorney general theory to allow attorneys' fees in public interest litigation in California.
Possible Legislation
Legislation to authorize attorneys' fees in California was
considered during the 1975 Regular Session of the legislature.
Senator Alfred H. Song introduced Senate Bill 664, which
would have added section 1021.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure. The proposed bill provided:
Section 1. The purpose of this Act is to hold both
public and private parties or entities accountable to the
public for their acts or omissions. It is the intent of the
Legislature that this purpose be carried out by the award
of attorney's fees, expenses, and costs to the prevailing
plaintiffs who bring actions which confer a substantial
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 620, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60.
9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
Id. at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194.

Id.

AFTER ALYESKA

1976]

benefit upon the public.
Section 2. Section 1021.5 is added to the Code of
Civil Procedure, to read:
1021.5 Upon motion, a court shall award attorney's
fees, costs and expenses to a prevailing plaintiff against a
defendant in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right if a significant benefit has been
conferred on a large class of persons and the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement are such as to
make the award essential.
As used in this section, "significant benefit" includes
a nonpecuniary, as well as a pecuniary benefit."'
Although Senate Bill 664 failed to be reported out of committee, an attempt that is being made to introduce a similar
measure in the 1976 legislative session has the approval of the
4
Board of Governors of the State Bar Association. ' The basic
difference between the bills is elimination of the requirement
of a prevailing plaintiff in the new bill. Instead, one need only
be a "successful" party, thus providing the possibility of recovering fees even though a settlement is achieved, or some
other resolution of the problem occurs without producing a
"winning" plaintiff.24
The tentative bill also provides that fees are only to be
granted if they cannot reasonably be paid out of the recovery,
and that fees may be awarded against, but not in favor of,
public entities. 4 '
It seems probable that the same concerns voiced about the
Song bill will be raised when its successor is introduced. Many
of these were aired when attorneys connected with public interest litigation attended hearings on Senate Bill 664 in September, 1975.

'

At that time, concern seemed to focus on how public interest should be defined, and by whom; who should be permitted
to recover fees; and whether a plaintiff should be required to
show that, absent the availability of fees, he would have been
financially unable to bring the action.
An argument was made that the legislature should clearly
246. Cal. S.B. 664 (1975).
247. . Telephone interview with Harold Bradford, legislative representative of the
California State Bar Association, Feb. 2, 1976.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. California Hearings, supra note 218.
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define the types of litigation sought to be encouraged by the
provision for fee-shifting. This could be done by adding or intentionally omitting to add an attorneys' fee provision to each
bill as it was passed,25" ' or alternatively, by defining the area of
"public interest" and letting the courts decide whether
a particular case fell within those parameters." 2 On the other hand,
several attorneys felt that it was important not to be too specific. Not all rights are protected by statutes, nor is it necessarily clear at one point in time what rights will exist and need
protection at another." 3
Several attorneys thought it important to award fees even
to a plaintiff who did not prevail, as long as the litigation
enhanced, preserved or protected important public rights or
public policy."' Proponents of this system, of course, opposed
awarding fees to a prevailing defendant."' Although it was
argued that it might be a denial of equal protection to deny fees
to prevailing defendants, 5 ' it was noted that many statutes
which provide fees to only the prevailing plaintiff have been
upheld against just such a challenge.257 To insist on awarding
fees to the prevailing defendant would in many cases, if not all,
cancel out the public policy reason for providing fee awards: to
"affirmatively encourage certain types of lawsuits
to enforce
statutory rights where the incentives would not otherwise
exist."25 s
There was no consensus as to whether awards should be
granted to a prevailing plaintiff public agency. Attorney Gen251. Id. at 41-42 (testimony of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General).
252. Id. at 46.
253. Id. at 113-14 (testimony of Ephraim Margolin, Esq.); id. at 72-73 (testimony
of Jerome Falk, Esq.); id. at 91 (testimony of Malcolm A. Misuraca, Esq.).
254. Id. at 84-85 (testimony of Armando Menocal, Esq.); id. at 116 (testimony
of Ephraim Margolin, Esq.). Mr. Margolin suggested that the bill include a provision
stating that the court "may" award fees to a non-prevailing plaintiff "where a significant benefit [was] conferred on a large class of persons in the course of or due to
litigation initiated by the plaintiff." Id.
255. Id. at 15 (testimony of Carlyle Hall, Esq.); id. at 55-56 (testimony of J.
Anthony Kline, Esq.); id. at 90 (testimony of Malcolm A. Misuraca, Esq.).
256. Id. at 22-23 (testimony of Thomas Hookano, Esq.); id. at 37 (testimony of
William L. Berry, Jr., Esq.).
257. Id. at 90 (testimony of Malcolm A. Misuraca, Esq.). See, e.g., Vinnicombe
v. State, 172 Cal. App. 2d 54, 341 P.2d 705 (1959): "[Ilf there is a reasonable basis
for the [legislative] classification attorneys' fees may be granted as part of the costs
to a particular class of litigants," Id. at 60, 341 P.2d at 708; accord, Beyerbach v. Juno
Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 11, 265 P.2d 1 (1954); Builders' Supply Depot v. O'Connor, 150 Cal.
265, 88 P. 982 (1907).
258. California Hearings, supra note 218, at 55.
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eral Younger suggested that public agencies be allowed to recover fees when they were prevailing plaintiffs.25 It was argued,
however, that the Attorney General's office and state agencies
are publicly funded for the purpose of enforcing specified
rights, and thus should not be awarded fees.2""
Finally, the Committee was urged to drop the language
that would limit an award of fees to cases where a recovery was
a "necessity," on the ground that the proviso would appear to
bar fee-shifting where the plaintiffs' attorney had agreed at the
outset not to charge his client. That is, if a foundation, or
otherwise funded firm agreed that the plaintiff would not be
responsible for fees, no debt would exist between plaintiff and
attorney for the conduct of the case, and the court could logically hold that being compensated for the representation was
obviously not a necessity and deny an award. As has been
indicated however, many public interest firms are in danger of
going out of business if they do not develop new ways to support
themselves."' If they have to turn to accepting only moneymaking cases, the whole idea of public interest representation
is defeated. Therefore, such a provision in the bill would seem
2 2
to disable the intent and purpose of fee awards. "
It is clear that there will be many hurdles to clear before a
bill establishing the private attorney general doctrine in California is passed by the legislature." ' At least one prominent
California public interest attorney thinks that although such
legislation is necessary, it would also be desirable to leave the
matter up to the courts, since they have the needed expertise
and understanding of the facts in each particular case to determine when an award would be proper.2" 4 If the California Supreme Court approves the private attorney general doctrine in
Serrano, legislation would probably not be needed. Whatever
the immediate outcome of these attempts to authorize feeshifting in public interest litigation, however, it seems certain
that the pressure will continue for regular awards of attorneys'
259. Id. at 44.
260. Id. at 27 (testimony of Dugald Gillies, Esq.); id. at 117 (testimony of
Ephraim Margolin, Esq.).
261. See text accompanying notes 138-40 supra.
262. CaliforniaHearings, supra note 218, at 74 (testimony of Jerome Falk, Esq.).
263. Id. at 10, 15, where Senator Song predicted that S.B. 664 would not have
an easy passage in the legislature.
264. Telephone interview with Sidney Wolinsky, managing attorney of Public
Advocates, Inc., a San Francisco public interest firm, Feb. 2, 1976.
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fees in public interest litigation until they become, of necessity,
the accepted practice in California.
CONCLUSION

American society has undergone vast changes in the past
few decades. Some of the rights for which enforcement is
sought today did not exist even 20 years ago. All too often,
however, the legislation which has conferred a right contains no
adequate mechanism for its enforcement. It becomes necessary, then, to resort to complex, time-consuming and expensive
litigation. Yet unless one who feels his rights have been violated can find a public interest attorney or firm to represent
him, the expense of such litigation will frequently prevent him
from vindicating a right vital to his own welfare, and that of
the general public.
The federal courts were attempting to alleviate this problem by the development of the private attorney general rationale, which allowed the award of attorneys' fees to a plaintiff
successfully litigating a "public interest" issue. However, the
Supreme Court decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society"'5 has effectively halted that practice. While it
is still possible for the state courts to continue to apply the
private attorney general theory, Alyeska is likely to spread its
chill in the state as well as the federal courts.
Consequently, it is clear that legislation is called for, on
both state and federal levels, that will ensure attorneys who
bring suits in the public interest adequate compensation, either out of a public fund or from the opposing party. Further,
the government should no longer be immune from fee assessments. Only then will the average citizen have some assurance
that his paper rights to such things as a decent environment
and equitable treatment in the marketplace exist and can be
enforced.
Joyce Elaine Allegro Dougherty
265.

421 U.S. 240 (1975).

